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As we count down to the general election, the press has focused on the implications for employment law. The Labour Party's proposals are extensive and billed as "the biggest upgrade to rights at work for a generation". The Conservative Party's plans had not been published at the time of writing. Before Parliament shut up shop, it passed the Paternity Leave (Bereavement) Bill, which has now received Royal Assent.
In the courts, decisions on worker status and individual respondents in discrimination claims will be relevant for some clients, while the Court of Appeal reached an important decision on discrimination protection for outsourced workers.
The Labour Party’s “New Deal for Working People” was originally announced in 2021, with promises to introduce day one rights for all workers, end fire and rehire, and ban zero hours contracts. “Delivering A New Deal for Working People”, published at the end of May, gives a clearer idea of what a Labour government might mean for worker rights.
As we reported last month, the Paternity Leave (Bereavement) Bill removes the qualifying service requirement for parents to be able to take paternity leave if a child’s mother or primary adopter dies. Employees in that situation will be able to take paternity leave even if they do not have the necessary qualifying service with their employer. They will also be able to take paternity leave after a period of shared parental leave, which is normally not permitted.
During the Bill’s third reading in the House of Commons, its sponsoring MP, Chris Elmore, confirmed bereaved fathers/ partners will be able to take up to 52 weeks’ leave during the first year of a child’s life, to allow them to be their child’s primary caregiver. Surviving adoptive and surrogate parents will have the same right. Employees exercising the right to extended paternity leave following a bereavement will have enhanced protection against redundancy and be able to take keeping in touch days.
As the Bill had cross-party support, it completed its passage before the dissolution of Parliament and received Royal Assent.
In Boohene v The Royal Parks Ltd the Court of Appeal overturned an earlier EAT decision that allowed outsourced workers to compare themselves with the client’s own employees for the purposes of a indirect race discrimination claim.
The Royal Parks had its own employees, who received pay of at least the London living wage as matter of policy. Day-to-day park operations, such as cleaning and maintenance, were outsourced. The Royal Parks did not require its contractors to pay their employees the London living wage. Employees on one such contract argued that this amounted to indirect race discrimination, as outsourced workers were more likely to be of black or minority ethnic origin.
Under s41 of the Equality Act, a principal must not discriminate against a contract worker “as to the terms on which the principal allows the worker to do the work”. The EAT found that s41 applied in this case. The Royal Parks effectively dictated the terms on which the contract workers were employed because it had chosen a non-London living wage tender.
The Court of Appeal upheld the Royal Parks’ appeal. Section 41 distinguishes between detriments which are the result of the terms of the worker’s contract of employment, which are a matter for the employer, and detriments imposed by the principal, such as the denial of benefits or services such as access to a canteen. On a proper analysis, this meant that complaints about contractual matters such as pay could only be brought against a worker’s employer, not the client in an outsourcing relationship.
Under the Equality Act, an employer is vicariously liable for acts of discrimination committed by its employees, unless it can establish that it took all reasonable steps to prevent the discrimination. Employees can also be personally liable for such acts and it is common for claimants to bring proceedings against both an employer and individual employees. In Baldwin v Cleves School, the EAT had to decide whether a tribunal can decide not to uphold claims against individual employees if it finds an employer vicariously liable for their discriminatory acts.
Miss Baldwin was a newly qualified teacher (NQT) with a disability. During her NQT induction year, the tribunal found that there were two incidents of discrimination. The first related to attempts by her mentor to gather information about her medical condition from her PGCE tutor. The second related to a comment in an assessment from the school’s headteacher that Miss Baldwin lacked integrity, which was connected to the way in which she had reacted to the enquiries about her medical condition and was not supported by evidence.
Although the tribunal upheld the claims against the school, it rejected claims against the mentor and the headteacher. It found that although they had acted misguidedly, and in a way that amounted to discrimination, they were attempting to deal with a complex situation informally, in the belief that this would be the best way to achieve a successful outcome. Their main failing was not seeking HR support sooner.
The claimant successfully appealed to the EAT. Under the Equality Act, tribunals do not have a discretion about whether to uphold claims against individual respondents if their employer is vicariously liable for their actions. Individual liability is not ancillary to that of the employer and tribunals cannot simply choose not to find against individuals if the claims against them are made out. The EAT upheld the claims against the individual respondents as well as the employer.
Groom v Maritime and Coastguard Agency in the EAT is a useful reminder about the principles to apply when deciding whether a volunteer is really a worker. Similar issues may come up when deciding whether an intern, for example, has worker rights.
Mr Groom was a member of the Coastguard Rescue Service. His membership was governed by the terms of a Volunteer Agreement, which said it was “a voluntary two-way commitment” between the parties “where no contract of employment exists”. Under the Volunteer Agreement, volunteers could claim an hourly rate for performing specified activities, plus expenses, although in practice some members did not claim payment.
When the Coastguard Rescue Service terminated Mr Groom’s membership after a disciplinary hearing, he claimed that he was a “limb b” worker and that he should have been permitted to be accompanied to the hearing by a trade union representative. The tribunal rejected his claim, finding that he did not have a contractual relationship with the Maritime and Coastguard Agency.
The EAT upheld Mr Groom’s appeal. It rejected the argument that volunteers cannot be workers or employees because the parties have no intention to create legal relations. The tribunal must consider whether there is a contract at all, and if so whether it is a contract to provide work or services to the other party, in the usual way. In this case, volunteers were entitled to remuneration in return for performing activities. The fact they had to claim the relevant sums did not mean that they were not entitled to them. The right to payment indicated that there was a contract between the parties when Mr Groom attended an activity for which he could claim payment. As he provided services personally and was not running a business, he was a worker.
Authored by Jo Broadbent, Ed Bowyer and Stefan Martin.