EU-UK Spotlight: Renewables, trade, and the global supply chain
Inheritance tax (IHT) on pensions: amendments to the Finance (No 2) Bill
Pension Protection Fund: announcement confirming zero levy
HMRC Pensions Newsletter 178: increase to normal minimum pension age (NMPA)
Pensions Regulator: February Regulatory Round-Up
Pensions Regulator (TPR): design defaults for different lives
Pensions Ombudsman: upholds complaint against independent trustee in relation to investment losses
Pensions Administration Standards Association: launches trustee-administrator engagement series
Alongside the Chancellor’s Spring Statement on 3 March 2026, the government has tabled numerous amendments to the provisions of the Finance (No 2) Bill which will bring many pension death benefits within the scope of inheritance tax (IHT) for deaths on or after 6 April 2027.
The most significant changes are as follows.
The Pension Protection Fund (PPF) has confirmed that it will not charge conventional schemes a levy next year (2026/27).
The PPF will maintain an Alternative Covenant Schemes (ACS) levy, but states that it expects this ACS charge to be "low" and "proportionate to the risks posed".
The PPF notes that schemes are still legally required to submit an annual scheme return submission in full via Exchange, including section 179 valuations and asset-backed contribution information. However, the announcement also confirms that schemes will no longer need to provide:
More detail on the zero levy announcement and information requirements can be found in the PPF’s Q&A document.
The PPF also reminds schemes that the Dun & Bradstreet insolvency risk portal will close from 1 April 2026, and prompts schemes to download any information they require by 31 March 2026.
HMRC’s Newsletter 178 includes information about the increase in normal minimum pension age (NMPA) from 55 to 57 from 6 April 2028. Points to note include:
The Pensions Regulator (TPR) has circulated its February Regulatory Round-Up. This summary is sent to trustees, advisers, employers and scheme managers who subscribe to it via Exchange.
Key items covered include:
TPR notes that there are two key updates to the return. Some schemes will be required to provide a more detailed breakdown of the unquoted/private equity asset class. TPR is also seeking from schemes with leveraged liability-driven investment (LDI) arrangements insight on how they prepare for collateral calls under extreme market conditions.
By law, trustees must provide TPR with a scheme return unless the scheme has only one member or another exemption applies. If a scheme return is not completed and submitted by the deadline, it will be a breach of the Pensions Act 2004 and trustees could face a fine.
The Pensions Regulator (TPR) has issued a blog reflecting on the impact of different life patterns, in particular career breaks, on pension outcomes. It includes analysis of the effect of a five-year career break, demonstrating that a break in the first 10 years of working life has a greater detrimental effect on ultimate pension pot size than time away from work later in life.
TPR comments that career breaks are “common, predictable and economically significant” and encourages schemes to develop default strategies which reflect the reality of contemporary working lives.
The Pensions Ombudsman (TPO) has determined that the independent trustee of a number of small self-administered pension schemes (SSASs) was 80% liable for losses suffered by co-trustees and members of those schemes in relation to certain high-risk investments.
TPO did not uphold a similar complaint against the administrator.
TPO treated the complaint as a "lead case", which covered certain other linked complaints, and is a relatively unusual example of TPO apportioning liability.
The three individual complainants had been advised by unregulated advisers to invest in certain high risk investments via SSASs with Rowanmoor Group Plc (Rowanmoor). Consequently, the complainants each became member-trustees of a single-member SSAS. Rowanmoor Trustees Limited (RTL) (a subsidiary of Rowanmoor) was an independent trustee and co-trustee of each SSAS. Two of the complainants signed a "client agreement" with RTL, through which RTL would provide "trustee services".
Each SSAS had different underlying investments, but had a similar structure and governing documentation. Rowanmoor acted as the administrator of each SSAS.
Rowanmoor wrote to the complainants, clearly stating that the proposed investments carried a "high risk", were not endorsed or recommended by them; and "strongly" recommended that the complainants take legal and other professional advice. The letter also purported to exclude liability in relation to the investments "to the maximum extent permissible by law".
The extent to which the letters were intended to cover RTL was not clear, although they referred in places to the Rowanmoor group, which would include RTL.
The investments turned out to be "effectively worthless". The member-trustees complained to TPO, claiming that Rowanmoor, including RTL as trustee, had failed to perform sufficient due diligence in relation to the proposed investments.
TPO rejected the complaints in relation to Rowanmoor as SSAS administrator. TPO considered the terms of the "client agreements" and concluded that the administrator had discharged its responsibilities "in a broadly satisfactory manner".
However, TPO upheld the complaints against RTL, which had "installed itself as a joint trustee" and was providing its professional services as an independent trustee to each SSAS for a fee. TPO believed that this made RTL a professional trustee, and, as such, RTL had additional responsibilities and duties.
TPO concluded that the investments were not ones which any reasonable trustee would have made. This breached the duty of care owed by RTL as trustee and fell below the standard of care owed by RTL to the complainants. In reaching this conclusion, TPO considered the economic and factual circumstances, and knowledge available, at the time the investments were made. TPO also considered the broader context; in particular, the circumstances of the individual members, the nature of the pension schemes and the need for diversification of investments.
TPO noted that the complainants were member-trustees of the SSAS, and co-trustees with RTL. Under each SSAS's trust deed and rules, trustee decisions on investments required unanimity.
TPO contrasted the position of the complainants (who did not have the knowledge or understanding to assess the suitability of the investments) with that of RTL (who was "uniquely placed", both in terms of being able to apply professional judgement as to the suitability of the proposed investments, and also to prevent the investments from proceeding if they were unsuitable).
TPO asserted that RTL had not tried and failed to fulfil its duties; instead, it had "failed to understand its duties and make any attempt to meet them, notwithstanding that it appeared to continue to charge for those services".
In conclusion, TPO found that an 80:20 apportionment of liability, between RTL and the complainants respectively, was appropriate, having taken account of RTL's status as a professional trustee with considerable experience of SSAS management and trusteeship.
When calculating financial redress, TPO used methodology that aimed to put the complainants back into the position they would have been in, had the investments not taken place (recognising the complainants' partial liability as co-trustees). This included the recovery of costs and taxes, and that the complainants should not be left with any ongoing liability for future costs and charges relating to the investments.
TPO declined to order payment directly to the complainants; and instead directed that the payments be made to the SSASs, noting that the complainants would be able to transfer their monies to a different arrangement.
On 26 February, the Pensions Administration Standards Association (PASA) published the final part of its series of guidance on delivering effective digital transformation in pensions administration: Part 3: Implementing Saver-Centric Digital Administration.
The guidance focuses on how schemes can translate digital transformation strategy into delivery; and highlights the importance of designing digital administration around saver needs and expectations, supported by scalable infrastructure, integrated systems and a culture of continuous improvement.
The guidance explores several key considerations, including:
Technology should be designed around the saver experience to deliver lasting value.
Every architectural decision should be tested against a single question: "How does this improve our members’ experience?". Schemes should aim to deliver real-time architecture, minimise delays in processing and deliver a seamless user experience.
The guidance also provides practical advice on how digital transformation approaches and roadmaps should reflect the scheme’s maturity.
Schemes investing in robust change management capabilities (broadly, supporting individuals in adapting to new technologies whilst ensuring projects deliver the intended benefits) position themselves for success regardless of scheme size or maturity level. This involves reshaping organisational structures by redefining what people do in their roles and creating a culture where everyone is comfortable with continuous learning and change.
The guidance sets out four phases of transforming how organisations work: (i) getting ready; (ii) building awareness and buy-in; (iii) building knowledge and skills; and (iv) "making it stick".
The traditional approach of replacing entire systems through "big bang" implementations can introduce significant risk, and is often unnecessary. Implementation components should be treated as evolving ecosystems. They should be developed component by component, rather than as static monolithic systems.
The guidance outlines common implementation approaches, and notes that the appropriate model will depend on scheme maturity, risk appetite and operational resilience.
On 2 March, the Pensions Administration Standards Association (PASA) published the first part of a new four-part trustee-administrator life-cycle series: Part 1: Why Trustee-Administrator Relationships Matter.
The series responds to increasing regulatory expectations, operational complexity and sustained pressure on administration services. It aims to promote clear engagement, strong governance frameworks and collaborative working practices between trustees and administrators. It is accompanied by practical tools and examples, including case studies and a suggested "Balanced Scorecard" to support performance measurement.
The first part sets the strategic context for the series and highlights why effective administration oversight is a core governance responsibility. It reinforces the principle that "administration is where governance becomes reality".
Subsequent parts will examine appointment, transition and the development of sustainable, high-quality trustee–administrator partnerships.
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Authored by Jill Clucas and Susanne Wilkins.