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The 25th anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement and President Biden’s visit to the island of Ireland have brought the Windsor Framework back to the top of the news agenda since its formal adoption by the UK and the EU on 24 March. President Biden gave his support to the Framework and encouraged a return to the power-sharing arrangements in the Stormont Assembly. This article explores the trade and business opportunities presented by the Windsor Framework and outlines its key solution to the democratic deficit - the Stormont Brake.
It also evaluates the practical importance of the recent Parliamentary approval of The Windsor Framework (Democratic Scrutiny) Regulations 2023 given the unanimous rejection by the DUP, as recently reaffirmed by Sir Jeffrey Donaldson who stated that Biden’s visit “doesn’t change the political dynamic in Northern Ireland”.
The Windsor Framework’s objective of restoring the smooth flow of trade within the UK internal market is addressed via trade provisions seeking to simplify the import of goods from Great Britain to Northern Ireland (“NI”). The Framework also aims to improve legal clarity, certainty and predictability for businesses operating in NI.
In the area of customs, the Framework broadens the scope of the “trusted traders” scheme, which simplifies the transport of goods from Great Britain to NI.
Businesses already registered for the trusted trader scheme should be able to automatically form part of the new scheme, while other businesses will need to formally apply.
The new trusted trader scheme is expected to be in place around September 2023, and will rely on a new database tracking shipments of goods in real time.
In the area of VAT and excise in NI, the Framework offers the UK more flexibility. The key provisions as are follows:
Parliament has passed the Windsor Regulations, a key step towards securing the necessary domestic power to implement the Stormont Brake, a UK veto to new EU law in Northern Ireland. Under the new mechanism, the Northern Ireland Assembly members (“MLAs”) will be empowered to trigger a veto mechanism with respect to the implementation of certain new EU laws in Northern Ireland; this new mechanism will be referred to as the “Stormont Brake”, inserted at Article 13(3a) of the Framework, and generally applies to new EU laws with respect to reliefs from customs duty on personal property, some EU customs rules, and most new laws with respect to goods.
The Brake can be triggered when the following, high, legal threshold has been met (highlight added for effect):
The key procedural aspects are outlined in Annex 1 to the Withdrawal Agreement Joint Committee’s Decision 1/2023 “laying down the arrangements relating to the Windsor Framework”. In summary, 30 MLAs from two or more parties must notify the UK Government of their wish for the Brake to be triggered, having:
provided a public explanation as to why these circumstances are “most exceptional”, this act is a “last resort”, and the conditions in 13(3a) are satisfied;
consulted with businesses, civic society and other traders; and
demonstrated all reasonable use of the applicable European consultation processes for new Union acts.
Part 2 of the Windsor Regulations establish a new Windsor Framework Democratic Scrutiny Committee of the Northern Ireland Assembly; it would ordinarily be the case that the Brake would not be triggered before the Committee had published an inquiry report, but the MLAs have the autonomy to review and consider further sources beyond the Committee’s advice and report.
If the MLAs decide to notify the government of their intention to trigger the Brake in accordance with the correct process, the government is legally obliged to notify the European Commission of the exercise of the veto. Alternatively, if the Brake has been trigged by the UK but there is EU contention with regard to its proper use, the ECJ will have no jurisdiction; an independent arbitration panel will decide whether the legal standard and proper process for triggering the Brake has been met.
Once the Brake has been triggered, the UK must proceed to partake in subsequent “intensive consultations” with the EU, under the procedure previously provided for in Article 13(4) of the Northern Ireland Protocol. However, the Windsor Regulations introduce new limits to the government’s discretion at this stage; essentially it cannot agree to any new law arising from this process which has been subject to the Brake, except where the Northern Ireland Assembly has passed a cross-community applicability motion in support. However, the Regulations introduce two exceptions to this rule:
when there are “exceptional circumstances” – such as the non-functioning of the Northern Ireland Assembly; and
when “the EU Act would not create a new regulatory border between Great Britain and Northern Ireland” –aside from providing a broad definition of “new regulatory border” there is very little guidance provided with respect to this exception.
It is important to note that the EU has always reserved its right to take “appropriate remedial measures” if alternative legislation / agreements with the UK cannot be achieved under the Article 13(4) process; a key drawback of the Brake is clearly that this process potentially enables the EU to overrule a UK veto.
Although the Windsor Regulations were passed by a large majority in Parliament, the DUP provided a unanimous rejection. Crucially, clause 1(a) of Annex 1 of the Joint Committee’s Decision requires the Northern Ireland Executive to be restored for the Brake to function. Therefore, Parliament’s approval will lack practical importance until the DUP are willing to restore a functioning executive.
Authored by Owen Robinson, Robert Gardener, Auriane Negret, and James Furneaux.